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OVERVIEW — The Medicare program’s physician payment method is in-
tended to control spending while ensuring beneficiary access to physician
services, but there are signs that it may not be working. The physician’s
role in the health care delivery system as the primary source of information
and treatment options, together with growing demand for services and the
imperfect state of knowledge about appropriate service use, challenge
Medicare’s ability to achieve these two goals. This issue brief describes the
history of physician spending and the contribution of escalating service use
and intensity of services to the rise in Medicare outlays, setting the stage
for further discussion about the use of the Medicare payment system to
control spending and ensure access.
This issue brief is the first of two related papers on physician spending and
Medicare’s sustainable growth rate. Please look for the companion issue
brief, due to be released October 2006.
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Medicare Physician
Payments and Spending
Medicare’s physician payment approach may be broken. Medicare pays
physicians based on a fee schedule, which is designed to promote the
delivery of the appropriate volume and mix of services to beneficiaries.
The fee schedule is combined with a spending target that is intended to
moderate the increase in physician spending. Annual changes in the fees
are tied to the difference between actual spending and the target. Since
2002, actual spending has exceeded the target, triggering reduction to
physician fees. After fees were lowered in 2002, however, concerns about
maintaining access to services led Congress to stop the fee reductions
determined through this payment approach.
Growth in the volume and intensity of physician services has caused
total Medicare physician spending to continue to rise. Physician groups,
however, are increasingly dissatisfied with the payment approach and
are calling for a system overhaul. Reform is expensive because the cu-
mulative spending in excess of the targets must be “paid back.” This
payback requirement inflates the federal budget cost of changing
Medicare’s physician payment approach, making it more difficult for
policymakers to enact a longer-term fix. As the rhetoric over physician
spending intensifies, it is important to keep in mind certain fundamen-
tal concepts about the role of physicians in health care delivery and the
possible unintended consequences of payment incentives on the
delivery of services.
PHYSICIAN PAYMENTS
Medicare spent $57.8 billion for physician services paid under the fee
schedule in 2005, almost 7 percent more in total and over 9.5 percent more
per beneficiary than the year before.1 Medicare physician fees were in-
creased by 1.5 percent between 2004 and 2005, but total spending went
up faster because beneficiaries received more services and more inten-
sive ones.2 Physician services, which accounted for 16 percent of total
Medicare spending, include office visits and consultations, termed evalu-
ation and management services; imaging; major and minor surgeries and
other procedures; and tests. Spending grew even faster for items and ser-
vices that are typically associated with, or “incident to,” physician office
visits, such as diagnostic x-rays, laboratory and other tests, and certain
drugs administered in physicians’ offices that have historically been
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covered by Medicare.3 Physician services plus these related services ac-
counted for 25 percent of the Medicare budget.
Rapid growth in physician spending in the late 1980s spurred Medicare
to replace its charge-based payment system with a fee schedule starting
in 1992.4 Fees are now based on the typical resources (professional time,
equipment, supplies, etc.) required to provide each service, rather than
physicians’ historical charges. This change was intended to rationalize
the payment for each service to reduce incentives for physicians to prefer
one treatment over another for financial reasons.
In conjunction with the fee schedule, Congress mandated a spending
target for physician services. The annual increase in physician fees de-
pends on the relationship between actual spending on physician
services and the target. The update is higher if spending is below the
target and is lower if spending is above the target. This link between the
update to the fees and the target was intended to dampen incentives
inherent in a fee-for-service environment for physicians to provide more
services and more intensive ones. Some believed that this would pro-
vide a collective incentive for physicians to control the volume and in-
tensity of services delivered.5
GROWTH IN PHYSICIAN SPENDING
The growth in spending on physician services slowed after the imple-
mentation of the fee schedule and spending targets, but it has picked
up in recent years. Prior to the
spending targets, annual growth in
physician services per beneficiary
averaged over 11 percent for more
than 10 years.6 With the initial ver-
sion of the target, spending growth
averaged 4.4 percent per beneficiary
from 1992 through 1997 (Figure 1).
Since then, physician spending
growth has been higher in every suc-
cessive year, except for 2002.
Growth in the volume and intensity
of physician services has become
more important in driving up physi-
cian spending than the update to
fees. In 1998, the volume and inten-
sity of physician and related  services
went up 1.6 percent. By 2004, volume
and intensity had grown 8 percent
and they grew another 7.5 percent by
1992–1997
Initial Spending
Targets
1998–2003
Current Spending
Targets
11.6%
1980–1991
Before Spending
Targets
4.4%
6.0%
FIGURE 1
Average Annual Change in
Medicare Physician Spending Per
Beneficiary Over Three Periods
Source: Government Accountability
Office (GAO), Medicare Physician
Payments: Concerns about Spend-
ing Target System Prompt Interest
in Considering Reforms, GAO-05-
85, October 2004; available at
www.gao.gov/new.items/d0585.pdf.
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2005, contributing to an 8.5 percent increase in physician and related
spending in that year.7
Spending for some physician services has grown faster than others (Fig-
ure 2).8 For example, between 2004 and 2005, spending for imaging ser-
vices grew 16 percent.9 Spending for laboratory and other tests grew 11
percent. Both of these categories of services accounted for a relatively
small share of total physician spending, yet, because they grew faster
than the overall average, they contributed a disproportionate share to
the total increase in spending. Imaging services were 14 percent of phy-
sician and related spending in 2005 but contributed 27 percent of the 8.5
percent total increase between 2004 and 2005. Laboratory and other tests
were 11 percent of total spending and contributed 15 percent to total
growth. This disproportionate contribution is particularly notable be-
cause these services may be more discretionary than others.
The difficulty in controlling Medicare spending by limiting the fees is illus-
trated by the experience with physician-administered drugs (Table 1, next
page). Prices were reduced in 2004 for the small number of pharmaceuti-
cals that have been covered by Medicare because they are administered in
the physicians’ office (such as chemotherapy agents). Congress acted to
significantly reduce the prices paid by Medicare in response to analyses
FIGURE 2
Change in Physician Spending, by Type of Service, 2004 to 2005
TYPE OF SERVICE 2004 2005
Evaluation & Management $33.1 $35.0
Procedures 22.6 24.6
Imaging 12.2 13.2
Laboratory & Other Tests 10.5 11.3
Prescription Drugs 8.7 8.5
Other Services 0.9 1.0
Total Physician Spending $87.1* $94.5*
billion billion
*Columns do not sum to totals due to rounding.
CHANGE
7.0%
9.0
16.0
11.0
–3.0
20.0
8.5%
Physician Spending
(in billions)
Source: Author’s estimates based on preliminary data from H. B. Kuhn, CMS, letter to Glenn
M. Hackbarth, MedPAC, April 7, 2006.
Medicare physician
spending is deter-
mined by the fees paid
and the volume and
intensity of services
provided.
31%
29%
27%
15% Laboratory & 
Other Tests
-4% Prescription 
Drugs  
   4% Other    
Evaluation & 
Management
Procedures
Imaging
Various services
contributed
different amounts
to the 8.5%
increase in
physician spending.
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that indicated that Medicare’s payments for these
drugs were often substantially higher than the cost
of purchasing them, resulting in overpayments to
physicians.10 The price cut was substantial, which
contributed to a marked reduction in spending for
these drugs. Volume and intensity continued to
grow, however, and products shifted from less ex-
pensive to more expensive (or more intensive) ones.
As a result, even though Medicare’s fees for these
products were reduced by over 20 percent in 2005,
drug spending only declined by 3 percent.
The rising use of imaging services has attracted par-
ticular attention. Imaging services have added sig-
nificantly to physician spending growth because of
increased volume and use of more sophisticated (and
more expensive) services. The dramatic spending
growth has raised concerns about the value and qual-
ity of these services. The Medicare Payment Advi-
sory Commission (MedPAC) examined the growth of imaging services
provided in physician offices. From 1999 to 2003, MedPAC documented a
cumulative 45 percent rise in imaging services per beneficiary, compared
to an increase of just over 20 percent for all physician services.11 Spending
on physician-provided imaging services rose 16 percent in both 2004 and
2005; during this time, more physicians were purchasing equipment to
provide these services in their offices.12
This increase was due to the notable
growth in service use as well as the
shift from less intensive (standard) to
more intensive (advanced, imaging
procedure, and echography) imaging
services from 2001 through 2005 (Fig-
ure 3). There has also been a shift in
the types of physician visits over this
period. Although the number of phy-
sician visits has gone up more slowly
than other services, the increase in the
more intensive visits has been faster
than the rise in the less intensive ones.
A recent study of total health care costs
of Medicare beneficiaries indicates
that, between 1987 and 2002, most of
the spending growth was due to the
rise in the number of patients being
treated for five or more conditions.13
Whether this reflects increased preva-
lence of disease, increased treatment,
TABLE 1
Percentage Change in Price,
Volume and Intensity, and Spending for
Physician-Administered Drugs, 2003–2005
  2003 2004 2005
Price 1.9% –11.7% –21.1%
Volume and Intensity 18.8% 24.6% 22.7%
Spending Change* 24.2% 11.5% –3.0%
* Other factors, such as change in beneficiaries, affect the change in total
spending.
Source: H. B. Kuhn, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), letter
to Glenn M. Hackbarth, Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC),
April 7, 2006; available at www.cms.hhs.gov/SustainableGRatesConFact/
Downloads/MedPAC_Letter_Estimated_2007.pdf.
Source: Author’s analysis of preliminary data from letters from
H. B. Kuhn, CMS, to Glenn M. Hackbarth, MedPAC, dated
March 31, 2005, and April 7, 2006.
FIGURE 3
Cumulative Growth in Medicare
Physician Spending for Imaging
Services, 2001–2005
Spending for
standard imaging
services, such as
chest x-rays and
mammography,
has slowed relative
to spending for
more intensive
imaging services
(advanced, imaging
procedure, and
echography).
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or some combination is not clear. Technological advances have expanded
treatment options and contributed to the rise in overall spending and
physician spending in particular.14 These advances may include more ef-
fective care for certain conditions and services that improve the quality
of life. Sometimes these advances make it feasible for certain services to
be provided in the physician office, instead of settings like the hospital
outpatient department. Although such a shift would not necessarily rep-
resent an absolute increase in services provided, it would contribute to
higher physician spending.15
ACCESS TO PHYSICIAN SERVICES
Efforts to control physician spending in the Medicare program raise con-
cerns about access to care. Reducing Medicare fees in accordance with
the spending targets could affect physicians’ willingness to care for Medi-
care beneficiaries. Indeed, physician groups have warned that projected
physician fee cuts will lead to reduced access to services. As noted by a
representative of the American Medical Association in testimony before
Congress, “according to surveys by the American Medical Association
(AMA) and Medical Group Management Association (MGMA), 45% of
physicians and 40% of group practices will be forced to limit the number
of new Medicare patients they can accept when the first cut of at least 5%
goes into effect January 1, 2007.”16 Likewise, the American College of Phy-
sicians stated that payment cuts will accelerate
the trend of declining interest in specializing in
primary care among medical students, which
could reduce access to services.17
To date, there are no indications that access for
Medicare beneficiaries has declined even though
fees were reduced in 2002 and fees have not kept
pace with inflation since then. According to a recent analysis by the Gov-
ernment Accountability Office (GAO), Medicare beneficiaries’ use of phy-
sician services is rising.18 The proportion of beneficiaries receiving any
physician service went from 41 percent in April 2000 to 45 percent in April
2005. For beneficiaries who received physician care, the average number
of services rose by 14 percent over this period. These trends applied across
all urban and most rural areas in all states. Even during 2002, the number
of beneficiaries served and the number of services provided grew. GAO
found that the proportion of beneficiaries who reported major physician
access problems was small and constant from 2000 through 2004. Fur-
ther, 99 percent of billed services were paid under assignment; that is,
Medicare’s fee was accepted as payment in full, and over 96 percent of
physicians participated in Medicare.
MedPAC found that the percentage of beneficiaries reporting no problem
getting an appointment for routine care or finding a new primary care
physician remained steady between 2003 and 2005.19 Further, Medicare
Reducing Medicare fees could affect phy-
sicians’ willingness to care for beneficia-
ries; however, use of physician services
continues to rise.
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beneficiaries indicated fewer problems getting a physician appointment
than the privately insured. A 2004–2005 survey of physicians, conducted
by the Center for Studying Health Systems Change, found that close to
72 percent of surveyed physicians said that they were accepting all new
Medicare patients, a percentage that was virtually unchanged from four
years earlier, and slightly higher than the percentage accepting all new
privately insured patients.20 Although 3.4 percent of surveyed physicians
were not accepting new Medicare patients, this proportion had not
changed and was similar to the percentage not accepting new privately
insured patients. MedPAC also reported that the number of physicians
delivering services to Medicare beneficiaries has more than kept up with
increases in beneficiaries since 1999.21
Although MedPAC annually reviews a range of indicators of access to care
and has not identified any systematic increase in access problems,22 there
could be situations in which access might be a concern. Localized access
problems or difficulties obtaining particular services or seeing particular
types of physicians could be issues for Medicare beneficiaries. Access may
be more challenging in areas where private payer fees are higher than
Medicare’s and where there are disproportionately more privately insured
patients. Particular services or procedures may be affected if physicians do
not invest in new technologies because of the lack of financial incentives or
rewards. Access could also be limited if some services are less profitable to
provide than others and physicians forego delivering the less profitable
services and shift to delivering the more lucrative ones.
ISSUES IN PHYSICIAN SPENDING
A variety of factors affect the number and type of services provided to
Medicare beneficiaries. There will be differences in treatment patterns
across what appear to be similar patients, yet observed variations and
patterns of growth in spending suggest that patient needs and prefer-
ences may not be the only determinants of the volume and intensity of
services delivered. The imperfect science of medicine, fast-paced techno-
logical advances and changing health care needs of an aging population,
combined with a culture that equates more with better, undoubtedly drives
some use and spending growth. The central role of the physician as the
health care decision maker creates a great potential for physicians to re-
spond to financial incentives if they choose. All of these factors need to be
recognized in cost control efforts that ultimately must balance the uncer-
tainties of treatments with the realities of the federal budget.
The Physician as Advisor
The physician typically determines the number and type of health care
services a patient will receive. Most Medicare beneficiaries are in the tradi-
tional fee-for-service program, in which the patient can choose which phy-
sicians or providers to consult. An important feature of this fee-for-service
Observed geographic
variations in spending
suggest that patient
needs and also finan-
cial incentives help
determine the services
delivered.
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environment is that physician income typically is directly correlated with
the number and type of services provided. Certainly, treatment decisions
predominantly reflect physician judgment, patient needs, preferences, and
other clinical considerations, but particularly when appropriate care is un-
certain or needs are ambiguous and the patient is covered by insurance,
there are financial and cultural incentives to provide more services.
Congress has long been concerned about the role of financial conflicts
of interest in contributing to increases in health care spending. A 1994
study demonstrated that physicians who had a financial interest in a
laboratory ordered more tests from that laboratory for their patients
than other physicians.23 This and similar evidence contributed to the
adoption of the so-called Stark anti-referral laws, which limit the ability
of physicians to refer patients to facilities (such as a freestanding labo-
ratory or an imaging center) in which they are part owners.24 However,
the limits do not apply to the services, procedures, pharmaceuticals,
and laboratory tests physicians provide in their own offices. Delivering
these services on the spot is convenient for the patient and may im-
prove the continuity and timeliness of care. However, these are some of
the very services that have shown the fastest growth.
Is More Better?
Substantial geographic variation in health care utilization has been well
documented over many years.25 For example, from 1999 to 2002, evalua-
tion and management services per beneficiary varied over two-fold across
the 50 largest metropolitan areas.26 Imaging and tests each varied over three-
fold. Geographic areas with higher use of health care services have not
been shown to have higher quality of care. In fact, some evidence indicates
the contrary. Quality of care, measured by use of some preventive mea-
sures and effective treatments, is lower in high-use areas. Appropriate ser-
vice use did not always increase with increases in aggregate use.27
Physician and hospital availability is related to the use of services. Areas
with higher use of discretionary services tend to be those with a larger
supply of physicians and hospital resources. Areas with higher spending
tend to have a higher proportion of physician specialists and fewer pri-
mary care physicians. Unmeasured quality or need differences likely ex-
plain some of the differences in utilization. These factors, however, are
unlikely to account for the full magnitude of the difference.
What Are the Best Practices?
The lack of agreed-upon standards for care may contribute to some of the
observed variability as well as the growth in service use. A recent study
by researchers at the Dartmouth Medical School found that the number
of physician visits for similar patients with a terminal condition varied
from an average of 50 visits during the last six months of life in one area
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to less than 16 in another.28 The researchers concluded that: “Evidence-
based medicine plays virtually no role in governing the frequency of
use of supply-sensitive services. Medical textbooks contain few evidence-
based clinical guidelines concerning when to hospitalize, admit to in-
tensive care, refer to medical specialists or, for most conditions, when to
order diagnostic or imaging tests for patients at given stages in the pro-
gression of chronic illness.”29
Although more health care is not necessarily better health care, underuse
is also a problem. When there are protocols for treating particular con-
ditions, they are not always followed.30 Widespread failures to provide
recommended care were documented in an analysis conducted by the
RAND Corporation. For example, only 24 percent of patients with dia-
betes received the tests recommended to monitor this condition over a
two-year period. Findings were similar for other chronic conditions,
which indicates that more widespread adherence to guidelines may fur-
ther increase service use.
The Connection Between Pricing and Volume
One issue widely discussed prior to the adoption of Medicare’s fee sched-
ule was whether, or the extent to which, physicians create demand for their
services to maintain or raise their income. The Congressional Budget Of-
fice and CMS, in estimating the budget impact of physician payment
changes, included a “behavioral offset” based on evidence that at least some
of the savings achieved by lowering fees would be offset by an increase in
utilization. A 1998 CMS study of changes in fees for particular services and
changes in the utilization of those services concluded that increased ser-
vice intensity “is more frequently observed in physician practices that have
had price reductions.”31
The profitability of individual services may affect their
utilization.32 While Medicare fees are intended to reflect
the relative resources required to provide each service
so that no service is more profitable than another, the
measurement of relative resources for the over 6000 dif-
ferent physician services is difficult. MedPAC posited that some overval-
ued services may be oversupplied because they are more profitable to
provide than others. Undervalued services may also be oversupplied if
providers seek to maintain their overall level of net revenues. Alterna-
tively, physicians may stop delivering undervalued procedures altogether
if the payments fall too far below the costs of delivery.33
Singling Out Physicians
Physicians have direct financial incentives to provide more services in a
fee-for-service environment. Those financial incentives are moderated some-
what for other categories of health care services because of two features of
Medicare fees are intended to reflect
the relative resources required to
provide each service.
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payment and coverage. First, Medicare relies on physician monitoring
and prescribing to control the amount and types of services provided in
health care facilities. For a beneficiary to receive home health care, for
example, a physician must approve a plan of care every 60 days, in part
to ensure that home health care is actually needed. Similarly, physicians
have to admit patients to and discharge them from hospitals. This reli-
ance on a physician’s professional judgment with respect to whether these
services are needed is some check on utilization. The decision about the
need for the service is not made by the provider that would directly ben-
efit financially from delivering the service.
The second payment feature that moderates other providers’ incentives for
delivering more care is that payments for institutional providers generally
are for a bundle of services, so the provider does not receive higher pay-
ments for providing more services. For home health care, Medicare pays the
agency for providing 60 days of care, regardless of the actual number of
visits provided.34 Although the payment is adjusted based on characteristics
of the patient and the treatment, it would be the same whether a patient
received 10 visits from the home health agency or 15. Similarly, a hospital is
paid for an entire stay, with the amount adjusted based on patient character-
istics that are known to affect treatment costs. As a result, the hospital is
financially rewarded for reducing its costs by controlling service use and
lengths of stay. Home health agencies and hospitals still have strong incen-
tives to seek additional patients; however those incentives are moderated by
the requirement that a physician determine the need for admission.
CONCLUSION
Controlling spending on physician services is challenging. Advances in
medical knowledge and technology continue to increase the number of
patients who can benefit from the services and treatments available. En-
suring that Medicare beneficiaries have access to these medical advances
requires appropriate and adequate physician payments. However, the
ability and willingness of society to continue to sustain the level of physi-
cian spending growth seen over the last few years may be eroding.
The physician plays a key role in sorting through medical information and
proposing patient treatment options. A variety of factors, such as clinical
indicators, treatment protocols, patient preferences, and physician prac-
tices, influence the amount and type of physician services a patient receives.
In many situations, there may be little consensus over appropriate service
use or optimal treatments. This climate of uncertainty, particularly when
physicians may financially benefit from one treatment choice over another,
contributes to concerns about the value of at least some of the recent growth
in the volume and intensity of physician services.
Medicare’s spending on physician services is determined by numerous
decisions made between physicians and their patients on the basis of clini-
cal judgment, preferences, and particular circumstances. In these decisions,
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the physician remains the key source of information, as even the best-
informed patients and the Medicare program must rely on physician ex-
pertise in determining the appropriate treatment. Global assessments of
the value to society of additional spending are extremely difficult because
they may conflict with the individual decisions that contribute to spend-
ing. The debate will continue over how to ensure appropriate fees to main-
tain beneficiary access, the best approach for the Medicare program in
controlling spending, and the role of the physician in achieving value.
ENDNOTES
1. This does not include beneficiary cost sharing. 2006 Annual Report of the Boards of Trust-
ees of the Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Funds,
May 1, 2006, available at www.cms.hhs.gov/ReportsTrustFunds/downloads/tr2006.pdf;
and 2005 Annual Report of the Boards of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal
Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Funds, March 23, 2005, available at www.cms.hhs.gov/
ReportsTrustFunds/downloads/tr2005.pdf.
2. Intensity is the quantity and quality of the resources used to provide a service. Inten-
sity increases, for example, when an MRI (magnetic resonance imaging test) is substituted
for an x-ray.
3. In this paper, physician spending refers to the Medicare outlays for services paid for
under the physician fee schedule. These are predominantly services provided by physi-
cians but under certain circumstances may include services provided by other health
professionals, such as therapists or nurse practitioners. The fee schedule is called the
resource-based relative value scale, or RBRVS.
4. Under the charge-based systems, physicians were paid the lowest of what they billed
for a service, the median of what they had billed for the service in the prior year, or a limit
based on what physicians in the area had historically billed for the service.
5. For a discussion of Medicare’s spending target, called the sustainable growth rate meth-
odology, please see the forthcoming National Health Policy Forum Issue Brief, “Medicare’s
Sustainable Growth Rate for Physician Fees,” scheduled for release in October 2006.
6. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Medicare Physician Payments: Concerns about
Spending Target System Prompt Interest in Considering Reforms, GAO-05-85, October 2004;
available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d0585.pdf.
7. H. B. Kuhn, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), letter to Glenn M.
Hackbarth, Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), March 31, 2005; and H.
B. Kuhn, CMS, letter to Glenn M. Hackbarth, MedPAC, April 7, 2006, available at
www.cms.hhs.gov/SustainableGRatesConFact/Downloads/MedPAC_Letter_
Estimated_2007.pdf.
8. H. B. Kuhn letter, March 31, 2005.
9. H. B. Kuhn letter, April 7, 2006.
10. General Accounting Office (GAO), “Medicare: Payments for Covered Outpatient Drugs
Exceed Providers’ Cost,” GAO-01-1118, September 2001; available at www.gao.gov/
new.items/d011118.pdf.
11. Glenn M. Hackbarth, MedPAC, “Medicare Payment to Physicians,” statement before
the Subcommittee on Health, Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives, November 17, 2005; available at www.medpac.gov/publications/
congressional_testimony/Testimony_111705_Phys_Pay.pdf.
Endnotes / continued ➤
Issue Brief – No. 815
October 9, 2006
National Health Policy Forum  |  www.nhpf.org 12
Endnotes / continued
12. H. B. Kuhn letter, April 7, 2006.
13. Kenneth E. Thorpe and David H. Howard, “The Rise in Spending Among Medicare
Beneficiaries: The Role of Chronic Disease Prevalence and Changes in Treatment Inten-
sity,” Health Affairs Web Exclusives, 25, no. 5 (August 22, 2006), pp. w378–w388.
14. See, for example, David M. Cutler and Mark McClellan, “Is Technological Change
in Medicine Worth It?” Health Affairs, 20, no. 5 (September/October 2001), pp. 11–29; avail-
able at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/20/5/11?maxtoshow=&HITS=
10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&author1=Cutler&andorexactfulltext=and&searchid=
1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT; and Jonathan S. Skinner, Douglas O. Staiger,
and Elliott S. Fisher, “Is Technological Change in Medicine Always Worth It? The Case of
Acute Myocardial Infarction” Health Affairs Web Exclusives, 25, no. 2 (February 7, 2006),
pp. w34–w47.
15. See MedPAC, Report to the Congress: Growth in the Volume of Physician Services, Decem-
ber 2004; available at www.medpac.gov/publications/congressional_reports/
Dec04_PhysVolume.pdf.
16. Cecil B. Wilson, American Medical Association (AMA), “Medicare Physician Cuts in
2007 and Beyond,” statement before the Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcom-
mittee on Health, U.S. House of Representatives, September 28, 2006, p. 1, available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/Hearings/09282006hearing2045/Wilson.pdf; and
“AMA survey shows steep medicare payment cuts will hurt access to care for America’s
seniors,” AMA, press release, April 5, 2005, available at www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/
category/14924.html.
17.  “Medicare Cuts Will Accelerate Looming Crisis in Patient Access to Primary Care”
American College of Physicians, press release, November 17, 2005, available at
www.acponline.org/college/pressroom/patient_access.htm.
18. GAO, “Medicare Physician Services: Use of Services Increasing Nationwide and Rela-
tively Few Beneficiaries Report Major Access Problems,” GAO-06-704, July 2006; available
at www.gao.gov/new.items/d06704.pdf.
19. MedPAC, Report to the Congress: Medicare Payment Policy, March 2006; available at
www.medpac.gov/publications/congressional_reports/Mar06_EntireReport.pdf.
20. Peter Cunningham, Andrea Staiti and Paul B. Ginsburg, “Physician Acceptance of New
Medicare Patients Stabilizes in 2004-05,” Center for Studying Health System Change, Track-
ing Report, results from the Community Tracking Study, No. 12, January 2006; available at
www.hschange.org/CONTENT/811.
21. MedPAC, A Data Book: Healthcare Spending and the Medicare Program, June 2006; available
at www.medpac.gov/publications/congressional_reports/Jun06DataBook_Entire_report.pdf.
22. MedPAC, Report to the Congress: Medicare Payment Policy, March 2006.
23. GAO, “Medicare: Referrals to Physician-Owned Imaging Facilities Warrant HCFA’s
Scrutiny,” GAO/HEHS-95-2, October 20, 1994; available at http://archive.gao.gov/f0902b/
152922.pdf. Also see, J. M. Mitchell and E. Scott, “Physician Ownership of Physical Therapy
Services. Effects on charges, utilization, profits, and service characteristics,” Journal of the
American Medical Association, 268, no. 15 (October 21, 1992), pp. 2055–2059.
24. The Ethics in Patient Referrals Act, Section 1876 of the Social Security Act.
25. Elliott S. Fisher et al., “The Implications of Regional Variations in Medicare Spending.
Part 1: The Content, Quality, and Accessibility of Care,” Annals of Internal Medicine, 138, no.
4 (February 18, 2003), pp. 273–288; Elliott S. Fisher et al., “The Implications of Regional
Variations in Medicare Spending. Part 2: Health Outcomes and Satisfaction with Care, Annals
of Internal Medicine, 138, no. 4 (February 18, 2003), pp. 288–299; and Victor R. Fuchs, “More
Variation in Use of Care, More Flat-of-the-Curve Medicine,” Health Affairs (October 7, 2004),
pp. VAR104–VAR107.
Endnotes / continued ➤
Issue Brief – No. 815
October 9, 2006
National Health Policy Forum  |  www.nhpf.org 13
The National Health Policy Forum is a nonpartisan research and public
policy organization at The George Washington University. All of its
publications since 1998 are available online at www.nhpf.org.
Endnotes / continued
26. MedPAC, Report to the Congress: Variation and Innovation in Medicare, June 2003; avail-
able at www.medpac.gov/publications/congressional_reports/June03_Entire_Report.pdf.
27. MedPAC, Report to the Congress: Variation and Innovation in Medicare, June 2003.
28. The Center for the Evaluative Clinical Sciences, Dartmouth Medical School, The Care of
Patients with Severe Chronic Illness: An Online Report on the Medicare Program by the Dartmouth
Atlas Project, 2006; available at www.dartmouthatlas.org/atlases/2006_Chronic_Care_
Atlas.pdf.
29. The Center for the Evaluative Clinical Sciences, The Care of Patients with Severe Chronic
Illness, p. 1.
30. Elizabeth A. McGlynn et al., “The Quality of Health Care Delivered to Adults in the
United States,” New England Journal of Medicine, 348 (June 26, 2003), p. 26.
31. CMS, “Physician Volume and Intensity Response,” memorandum from Volume-and-
Intensity Response Team, Office of the Actuary, HCFA, to Richard S. Foster, Chief Actuary,
August 13, 1998; available at www.cms.hhs.gov/ActuarialStudies/downloads/
PhysicianResponse.pdf.
32. Paul B. Ginsburg and Joy M. Grossman, “When the Price Isn’t Right: How Inadvertent
Payment Incentives Drive Medical Care,” Health Affairs Web Exclusives (August 9, 2005),
pp. w376–w384.
33. MedPAC, Report to the Congress: Medicare Payment Policy, March 2006. Also see Jack
Hadley and James D. Reschovsky, “Medicare fees and physicians’ medicare service vol-
ume: Beneficiaries treated and services per beneficiary, International Journal of Health Care
Finance and Economics, 6, no. 2 (2006), pp. 131–150.
34. A per diem payment method is used if a patient receives fewer than five home
health visits.
